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We examine how a manager’s ethnic cultural background affects managers’ communication with 
investors. Using a sample of earnings conference calls transcripts with 26,430 executives from 42 
countries, we find that managers from ethnic groups that have a more individualistic culture (i) use 
a more optimistic tone, (ii) exhibit greater self-reference, and (iii) make fewer apologies in their 
disclosure narratives. Managers’ ethnic culture has a lasting effect on their narratives—the effects 
persist even for executives who are later exposed to different ethnic cultures through work 
experience. The effect of ethnic heritage is observed in dialogues that reflect real time interactions 
(i.e., Q&As) and less pronounced in the scripted, less spontaneous portion of the calls (i.e., 
management discussion). The capital market responds positively to optimistic tone yet does not 
distinguish between the optimism in tone of managers from different ethnic backgrounds. The 
findings suggest that managers’ ethnic backgrounds have a significant effect on how they 
communicate with the capital markets and how the markets respond to the disclosure event. 
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A growing literature demonstrates that culture has an impact on a wide range of economic 
activities (Guiso et al. 2006; Alesina and Giuliano 2015). This literature argues that shared values 
and preferences impact the way that people respond to economic incentives and the institutions 
that make up an economic system. Despite the apparent pervasive nature of culture, the accounting 
literature has provided little understanding of its impact on accounting information or capital 
market activities. In this study we begin to build that understanding by examining how the cultural 
background of executives, based on their ethnic heritage, affects the ways they communicate with 
the capital market. 
We use insights developed from a long line of research in cultural psychology to examine 
how the communication style of individuals vary by ethnic groups. In particular, we focus on 
cultural characteristics associated with the extent to which an ethnic group is characterized to have 
an individualistic or collectivist culture. The individualism vs. collectivism cleavage is based on 
the extent to which individuals derive value from having an independent self-construct, as opposed 
to being strongly integrated into a cohesive group. This cultural dimension is considered the single 
most fruitful dimension in cross-cultural psychology (Heine 2008, 2010; Gorodnichenko and 
Roland 2012) and has been shown to correlate with individuals’ preferences for their own 
achievement and recognition, in contrast to harmony and cooperation with others (Kitayama et al. 
1997). 
We hypothesize that individuals from cultures that are more individualistic disclose 
information in a more optimistic and self-referencing manner. The prediction is based on the 
psychology literature findings that in independent cultures (typically Western), there is greater 
demand to influence individuals through displays of optimism and self-confidence. Consequently, 
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studies find that people from individualistic cultures seek to maximize the positive and minimize 
negative aspect of things more than people from collectivistic cultures (Sims et al. 2015). Also, 
self-attributions are more prevalent in cultures where independence is highly valued (Hallahan et 
al. 1997; Heine et al. 1999). 
Conference calls present a unique disclosure event as they include both a scripted, pre-
rehearsed portion (management discussion) at the beginning of most calls followed by the more 
extemporaneous Q&A section at the end. Prior research argues that conference calls provide 
relevant information to investors because much of their information is disclosed interactively, 
which allows for more extemporaneous disclosures that address the specific concerns of those 
participating in the calls (Matsumoto et al. 2011; Lee 2016). For this reason, we focus on the Q&A 
portion of the calls for our main empirical test. Further, we expect that these unscripted responses 
are more likely to be influenced by managers’ informal communication style than would a scripted 
speech. Consistent with that, prior studies show that cultural attributes are more likely to be 
reflected when the disclosure is more extemporaneous (Gluszek and Dovidio 2010). Thus, we 
expect ethnic cultural background to have more of an impact in the Q&A section of the conference 
call.   
We apply content analysis to executives’ disclosure narratives during earnings conference 
calls to capture the executives’ level of optimism and self-confidence. In particular, we examine 
three disclosure attributes measured at the individual manager-level: tone, self-reference, and 
apologies. Disclosure tone captures the level of optimism (Loughran and McDonald 2011). Self-
reference is the extent to which individuals implicates the self during the information releases, 
measured as the prevalence of the use of singular first personal pronouns during the calls. Both 
self-reference and apologies are more closely related to self-confidence (Chatterjee and Hambrick 
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2007; Libby and Rennekamp 2012; Okimoto et al. 2013). We use these measures as empirical 
constructs of our predictions of optimism and self-confidence.  Specifically, we expect that 
managers from a more individualistic ethnic background speak in ways that are more optimistic 
(i.e., more positive tone) and self-confident (i.e., greater self-reference and fewer apologies).1 
We identify the ethnic group of executives based on their surnames in the conference call 
transcripts. We match each surname to an ethnic group using the ethnicity-name matching 
technique developed by Kerr (2008). The matching algorithm uses the name databases of two 
marketing companies, Melissa Data Corporation and List Services Direct, Inc., which developed 
them for use in direct-mail advertisements. The technique classifies each name into nine distinct 
ethnic groups: Anglo-Saxon, Chinese, European, Hispanic, Indian, Japanese, Korean, 
Russian/Slavic, and Vietnamese.2 After identifying the ethnic background of each executive, we 
assign an individualism score, which varies by each ethnic group based on data from Hofstede 
(2001).  We use that measure to examine the impact of culture on the conference call disclosure 
attributes. 
We find that managers from individualistic cultures are likely to use a more positive tone, 
use greater self-reference, and make fewer apologies. 3 The findings hold after controlling for 
contemporaneous fundamentals (including the earnings news), other country-level factors that 
                                                          
1 Nonetheless, in an increasingly global economy, capital and labor market forces may dilute the effect of top-level 
executives’ cultural roots on their communication with an international audience. This, among other reasons, forms the 
basis for our null hypothesis.   
2 The matching procedure utilizes all of the name assignments in the database and assigns a probability distribution of 
each name, giving first priority to surnames. While other data vendors provide similar services, the advantage of the 
database provided by these companies is in their identification of Asian ethnicities, especially Chinese, Indian, 
Japanese, Korean, Russian/Slavic, and Vietnamese names (Kerr 2008). See Appendix A and Kerr (2008) for more 
details on the matching process. 
3 We use the Q&A portion of the calls to focus on real-time communication. The Q&A portion of the calls is less 
likely to be scripted than the management discussions, and therefore is more likely to reflect the preferences of the 
speaking manager rather than the firm (e.g., legal counsel or the IR department). In subsequent analysis, we show how 
cultural effects differ in the management discussion section which tend to be less interactive and more scripted. 
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may affect information environments and disclosure quality in different countries, and other 
manager characteristics such as age and gender. Our findings also continue to hold when we limit 
our sample to executives from companies based in a single country (the US). Hence, our results 
are not driven by differences in country-level institutions. 
Next we turn to the persistence of managers’ inherited cultural influence on their 
disclosure. We find that the cultural traits that executives inherit from their ethnic groups are long 
lived. We examine executives who are later exposed to different cultures, through cross cultural 
work experience or education. While we find that these executives express themselves in a way 
that is less reflective of their inherited individualism than their non-exposed peers, the impact of 
the inherited culture still remains at a significant level. Also, the effects persist regardless of 
whether the firm is releasing positive or negative news, suggesting that disclosure incentives do 
not mitigate the effect of culture.4 
While prior research generally measures conference call attributes such as tone at the firm 
level, we show that individual manager’s cultural backgrounds impact their communication.  
Having shown this “first moment” impact, we examine the impact that diversity of cultural 
backgrounds creates in the variation in the overall tone of the firm. That is, we examine whether 
the standard deviation of tone across individuals is greater when there is a greater ethnic diversity 
on the management team. We find evidence consistent with diversity in cultural increasing 
variance in communication within an individual conference call. This suggests that firms with a 
more diverse management group may send a less consistent message during the call. 
The empirical tests thus far focus on the Q&A section of the calls. In additional tests, we 
use the management discussion (MD) section of the call and examine whether the cultural effects 
                                                          
4 For example, it is possible that managers may have more incentive to self-reference when they are communicating 
good news than bad news (Kimbrough and Wang 2014).  
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of managers’ disclosure vary by whether the disclosure is extemporaneous. For our research 
question, this distinction is important as it allows us to examine the scripted, formal preplanned 
introductory remarks in the MDs and compare them to extemporaneous Q&A. The MD section of 
the calls are often referred to as “prepared remarks” and often created by a team which includes 
the manager and communication specialist (Lee 2016). Further, they are generally read off a script 
or even prerecorded. The preparers may unintentionally weaken the impact of culture in this group-
created disclosure simply because members of the group likely come from different backgrounds. 
There may also be a more purposeful mitigation of any ethnically driven communication 
differences. Consistent with cultural attributes being reflected in more interactive extemporaneous 
disclosures, we find that the Q&A section more strongly reflects the ethnic origins of the speakers 
than the MD section. In fact, in the MD section of the call, we find evidence of firms/managers 
overcompensating for their cultural attributes. This finding suggests that cultural attributes are 
more likely to surface in real-time interactive disclosures and firms may take measures to 
overcome such cultural preferences. 
Our results are robust to a wide range of specifications. Our main specification is a 
manager-level regression of disclosure attributes on managers’ individualism based on their ethnic 
backgrounds. The regressions control for executive, conference call, firm, and country 
characteristics. As alternatives, we include firm fixed effects and use only within firm variation in 
managers’ ethnicity, primarily driven by ethnic diversity in the management team.5 Also, we 
restrict the sample to conference calls held by U.S. firms to minimize the possibility that our results 
could be driven by unobserved country characteristics. We find robust results. 
                                                          
5 We also document significant effects using a changes analysis, with the exception of self-reference. By using the 
changes in the ethnic mix of the management team from one call to another we are able to better control for unobserved 
firm-level factors that drive the observed association. 
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The primary goal of our paper is to examine the impact of cultural background on 
information provided to the markets. For completeness purposes, we examine the capital market’s 
response to the difference in disclosure tones stemming from the executives’ cultural backgrounds. 
We first examine tone without conditioning on cultural backgrounds. We confirm that the 
association found in prior literature also exists in our sample. That is, optimistic tone is associated 
with positive cumulative abnormal intra-day returns during the conference calls. However, we find 
no evidence that the market differentiates the disclosure tone of managers from different ethnic 
backgrounds. That is, positive tone leads to similar market returns regardless of the management 
team’s ethnic makeup despite the fact that we have shown the tone is influenced by that ethnic 
makeup. Both of these findings suggest that capital market participants do not adjust for 
managerial cultural background when processing the implications of tone for firm value 
Our paper contributes to the literature by examining the importance of individual 
managers’ ethnic cultural backgrounds on the disclosure provided by firms. Despite theoretical 
arguments for the important role that culture plays in shaping individual behavior (Robalino and 
Robson 2013; Karolyi 2015), empirical evidence on how this shaping manifests in the context of 
corporate reporting is largely missing. Our study shows that cultural heritage has an economically 
meaningful impact on corporate disclosure, thus providing important evidence on the existence of 
the cultural transmission of managerial behavior through ethnic groups.  Further, by showing that 
the impact is greater in extemporaneous disclosures, our study highlights the need to consider the 
impact on different components of disclosure differently.  For example, we may not see a large 
impact on formal written communication, such as earnings announcements, but we would expect 
a large impact on informal personal interactions such as the Q&A studied here that are increasingly 
being shown to be important. 
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Second, our research also contributes to the literature on how CEO characteristics affect 
firm policies. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) were the first to show the existence of CEO fixed effects 
in corporate outcomes, and Davis et al. (2014) subsequently document a manager-specific 
component to disclosure tone and its value-relevance. Other papers have looked at specific traits 
of individuals (Malmendier et al. 2011; Roussanov and Savor 2012). We add to this literature by 
showing that managers’ cultural backgrounds, by shaping their values and preferences in the early 
stages of their lives, affect corporate disclosure policy. In contrast to prior studies that show that 
work experience shapes the preference of managers (e.g., Dittmar and Duchin, 2015), we show 
that the role of inherited cultural background is long lasting and persists even when individuals are 
later exposed to different cultures. 
Finally, we contribute to the growing literature on corporate culture (Guiso et al 2015; 
Graham et al. 2015). Hofstede et al. (1990) argue that ethnic cultures form one’s values through 
early socialization, while corporate culture acquired through work experience involves the 
subsequent acquisition of organizational practices (Van den Steen 2010). To the extent that 
individuals’ values inherited through their cultural background are difficult to alter, the findings 
have implications for the effects of corporate culture that are acquired later on in one’s career.  
 
2. Hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Inherited culture and disclosure attributes 
A recent literature in accounting and finance examines the linguistic properties of corporate 
financial disclosures. One of the most studied dimensions is disclosure tone, i.e., the relative use 
of words that are considered positive versus negative. While the positive association between 
disclosure tone and contemporaneous measures of economic performance is an empirical 
regularity (Feldman et al. 2010; Price et al. 2012; Huang et al. 2014), little is known about the 
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broader determinants of tone. Davis et al. (2014) offer evidence that an executive’s own 
preferences have a significant effect on disclosure tone. They document a significant manager-
specific component to tone in U.S. firms’ earnings conference calls and further show that a 
manager’s tone is more positive for those who are involved in charitable organizations, and lower 
for former investment bankers and those who were born during a recession. While these results 
offer clues about which speakers’ characteristics can shape disclosure tone, the question remains 
open as to where these managerial characteristics come from. Also, it remains unknown whether 
the styles of the individuals represent characteristics that a person inherits or whether they are 
situational. 
In this paper, we examine how the cultural backgrounds of individual managers—based on 
their ethnic heritage—affect their disclosure narrative. The cultural psychology literature has long 
shown that the individualism vs. collectivism dimension has a strong effect on how individuals 
communicate and interact with others (Markus and Kitayama 1991). Individualism refers to the 
degree to which people focus on their internal attributes, such as their own abilities, to differentiate 
themselves from others (Hofstede 2001). Studies find that cultures with strong individualism tend 
to have an independent rather than an interdependent self-construct (Chui et al. 2010). In 
individualistic cultures, individuals tend to view themselves as “an autonomous, independent 
person” (Markus and Kitayama (1991, p. 226)), while in collectivistic cultures, individuals view 
themselves “not as separate from the social context but as more connected and less differentiated 
from others” (Markus and Kitayama (1991, p. 227)). 
Prior literature has found individualism to be related to several behavioral patterns. In the 
finance literature, Chui et al. (2010) argue that individualism is related to cross-country differences 
in overconfidence. The authors show that in countries with high individualism, there are greater 
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returns to momentum trading strategies—where stocks that realize the best (worst) returns 
continue to perform well (poorly) in the future. The psychology literature also links individualistic 
cultures and self-attribution, defined as the tendency of people to “enhance or protect their self-
esteem by taking credit for success and denying responsibility for failure” (Zuckerman 1979, p. 
245). Kagitcibasi (1997) argues that that the tendency to promote self-esteem in individualistic 
cultures results in pervasive self-attribution as well as overconfidence. Even if positivity can be 
observed across cultures, Hallahan et al. (1997) show that in Western cultures where individualism 
and uniqueness are highly valued, self-referencing is more prevalent. In contrast, self-referencing 
is less prevalent in Eastern cultures, because standing out or stressing one’s superiority sets one 
apart from their peers, which is viewed negatively in collectivist cultures (Kobayashi and Brown 
2003). 
Apologies can also be symptomatic of individuals’ self-esteem (Okimoto et al. 2013). 
Across cultures, several studies find that Japanese individuals apologize more often than their 
American counterparts (Takagi 1996; Sugimoto 1997). Maddux et al. (2011) argue that this is due 
to individualistic (such as the U.S.) and collectivist (such as Japan) cultures using apologies for 
different reasons: Individualistic cultures consider apologies as a self-denigrating act and 
mechanism to assign blame, whereas collectivist cultures use it as a general expression of remorse. 
In collectivist cultures, apologies reflect one’s concern of being imposing on others; they serve to 
minimize the individual, even in situation where responsibility is clearly absent (Heine et al. 1999). 
Prior studies also find a positive link between individualism and optimism. Triandis (1995) 
argues that individualism is positively associated with levels of self-esteem and feelings of well-
being. While individuals from Western cultures exhibit optimism bias (Taylor and Brown 1988), 
those from Eastern cultures exhibit greater self-criticism (Markus and Kitayama 1991; Kitayama 
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et al. 1997). Similarly, Heine et al. (1999) find that people in individualistic cultures, such as the 
United States, tend to believe that their abilities are above average. In contrast, people in 
collectivist cultures are concerned with behaving appropriately and adapting to different social 
situations. They tend to have high self-monitoring and adjust their behavior to what is expected in 
their social environment (Biais et al. 2005). 
Hence, insofar as an optimistic predisposition translates into an individual’s choice of 
words, it follows that individuals from more individualistic cultures (and thus more optimistic 
ones) are more likely to express themselves in a positive, self-referencing, non-apologetic tone.6 
We formulate our first hypothesis directionally: 
H1: Managers with an ethnic background from a more individualistic culture exhibit a more 
positive, self-referencing, and non-apologetic tone, controlling for the underlying earnings news. 
 
We posit that ethnic background plays a role in the degree to which an individual inherits 
a more individualistic or collectivist cultural background, primarily through their upbringing. 
Furthermore, we argue that inherited cultural heritage will have a lasting effect on the individual. 
In other words, cultural heritage will have a persistence effect on the individual, which withstands 
the situational forces and other experiences the individuals are exposed to after birth.  We test this 
conjecture by examining the strength of the effect of ethnic heritage for a subsample of managers 
that are later exposed to other cultures through work experience. For such executives, it is possible 
that they are ‘made’ to speak in a way that is more consistent with a different ethnic group. 
                                                          
6 It is worthy to note that many of the managers included in our study are non-native speakers of English. Thus, 
underlying our prediction is the assumption that cultural differences, as captured by tone and other similar linguistic 
patterns, are reflected in the disclosures, even if the speakers do not speak in their mother tongue (Brochet et al. 2016). 
This assumption can be violated if cultural differences are lost in translation. For example, English learners can be 
influenced by instructors and/or materials that reflect Anglo-Saxon individualism/optimism. Alternatively, a culture’s 
tendency towards greater individualism/optimism may only be captured by the domestic language: For example, 
languages in individualistic cultures are less likely to allow for pronoun drop than those in collectivist cultures 
(Kashima and Kashima 1998). 
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Furthermore, top executives of large international corporations are likely amenable to making such 
changes. For example, if an American-born CEO works at a Japanese company, the influence of 
his/her colleagues and work environment might induce him/her to speak in ways that are more 
consistent with the Japanese culture. Hence, executives later exposed to cultures that are different 
from their ethnic inheritance may be affected by the behavioral traits of the new culture.  
If individuals’ values inherited through their cultural background are difficult to alter, 
inherited cultures will have a lasting effect on individuals’ disclosure. However, if the acquired 
culture can be learned through continuous exposure to the point of dominating the inherited 
culture, the effect of inherited culture may be muted. In our second hypothesis, we test the relative 
strength of inherited ethnic cultures for those who have vs. have not been exposed to a different 
ethnic culture later on in their career. 
H2: For managers with greater exposure to ethnic cultures that are different from their own, the 
effect of the inherited ethnic background on disclosure attributes will be weaker. 
 
Next, we examine whether the effect of ethnic backgrounds on disclosure outcomes varies 
by disclosure venue. While the effect of ethnic culture may be long lasting for an individual, there 
could be forces that can “undo” the cultural component of their disclosure tone. Because 
conference calls are important events that provide relevant information to investors, there are other 
institutional forces that may affect how the managers speak. Therefore, if people involved with 
disclosures (legal departments, investor relations group) are fully aware of cultural differences, it 
is likely that they adjust for those differences to conform to some global norm in order to change 
outsiders’ perceptions. We exploit the dual nature of earnings conference calls and test for the 
different effect of culture for more vs. less extemporaneous disclosure venues.   
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We consider the Q&A section, which is highly interactive, to be more extemporaneous 
and the MD section to be more scripted and less extemporaneous. We predict that individual 
managers’ cultural attributes are reflected more in the Q&A section than in the MD section, where 
other firm-level efforts are more likely to shape the disclosure tone of managers. Hence, managers 
may show no evidence of disclosure style consistent with their ethnic backgrounds, and may even 
show signs of overcompensation for their cultural attributes. 
H3: The effect of ethnic background on disclosure attributes will be stronger when the 
communication is more extemporaneous (i.e., Q&As) than less extemporaneous (i.e., management 
discussions). 
 
2.2 Capital market consequences of disclosure tone and its cultural component 
Holding culture aside, the literature has examined the association between our disclosure 
attributes of interest and measures of economic performance. The positive association between the 
tone of earnings announcements and short-window stock returns around those announcements is 
a well-documented empirical regularity in the U.S. (Henry 2008; Davis et al. 2014; Demers and 
Vega 2014; Huang et al. 2014).7 This suggests that disclosure tone is incrementally informative 
about firm performance beyond the earnings surprise. Another strand of the literature examines 
the capital market implications of individualism.8 It follows from the two largely independent 
literatures that the capital market implications of disclosures are likely to vary along cross-country 
cultural differences.  
                                                          
7 While the literature examines the decisions of overconfident investors, we are not aware of any studies that 
examine the stock market implications of managers’ self-referential disclosures and apologies.  Therefore, we limit 
our capital market tests to tone as the disclosure attribute of interest. 
8 Using individualism as a proxy for overconfidence and self-attribution bias, Chui et al. (2010) find a positive 
association between country-level individualism and (i) trading volume, (ii) volatility, and (iii) momentum profits and 
conclude that their results are likely consistent with a behavioral explanation for cross-country variation in momentum 
profits. Eun et al. (2015) document higher firm-specific stock return variation in individualistic countries, which they 
attribute to analytical thinking styles and less herding in those countries. Lastly, Pevzner et al. (2015) document a 
positive association between unsigned market reactions to earnings announcements, as measured by abnormal trading 
volume and return variance, and country-level individualism. 
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Our baseline prediction is that disclosures with a more positive tone elicit higher stock 
returns, holding the underlying earnings news constant. If H1 holds, then the implication is that 
firms whose managers come from a less individualistic background are penalized: for a given piece 
of news, their disclosures are less optimistic, which would lead to lower stock returns. However, 
another possibility is that the capital market consequences of disclosure attributes vary with 
culture. That is, the same level of optimism may elicit higher or lower belief revisions depending 
on the individualism of both the speaker (managers) and the audience (investors). For example, 
investors may misinterpret the tone of a manager from a relatively collectivist background as 
implying worse news than they would from a manager from a more individualistic background, 
even if the earnings surprise were the same for both. Given the limited guidance from theory and 
prior literature, we do not form a hypothesis in that regard. Instead, we leave the association 
between stock returns and the interaction between individualism and tone as an empirical question. 
 
3. Sample and empirical measures 
 
3.1. Sample selection and classification of managers by their ethnic groups 
 
Our primary data source for conference call transcripts is Thomson StreetEvents. 
Additionally, we obtain from Factset the transcripts of calls held by East Asian firms that do not 
subscribe to StreetEvents. This adds up to a cross-country sample of calls from 5,321 unique firms 
domiciled in 42 different countries. 
Table 1 shows the details of the sample selection process for the earnings conference calls. 
We include all call transcripts between 2002 and 2012, subject to some minimal constraints. We 
require the calls to occur within the three days around an earnings announcement and we drop calls 
from countries with fewer than 30 observations during our sample period. We drop calls with a 
length in the bottom 5% of our sample, as measured by the total number of words. This ensures 
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that our measures are based on dialogues with sufficient text. We drop calls that use translators 
because the tone of the original message may get lost during the translation process. Finally, we 
require firms to have financial data: total assets (WC02999), net income (WC01706), common 
equity (WC03501), and total debt (WC03255) from Worldscope and daily price (RI), volume 
(VO), and market value (MV) data from Datastream. Our final sample consists of 57,740 
conference calls held by 5,021 unique firms.  
The unit of observation in our main tests is a manager-conference call. Conference call 
transcripts in StreetEvents and Factset identify call participants every time they speak. Using all 
corporate managers (primarily CEOs, CFOs, but also COOs, CMOs, IROs, etc.) who speak during 
the Q&A portion of our sample calls, our sample includes a total of 129,787 manager-conference 
call observations with 24,901 unique individuals.  
To assign each individual to their most likely ethnic group, we collect the managers’ first 
and last names directly from the conference call transcripts. We then map the names into ethnic 
groups using the ethnicity-name matching technique developed by Kerr (2008).9 The matching 
process exploits the fact that people with particular first names and surnames are likely to be of a 
certain ethnicity. The matching process uses both first names and surnames, however, it gives 
priority to surnames.10 The underlying pool of ethnic names is based on the database of two 
marketing companies that developed it to use in direct-mail advertisements.11  The technique 
classifies each name into nine distinct ethnic groups: Anglo-Saxon, Chinese, European, Hispanic, 
                                                          
9 Alternatively, managers’ nationality can be used to identify their ethnic group. However, information on nationality 
is missing for a large portion (more than 70%) of our sample. Also, nationality can later be altered for naturalized 
managers, adding measurement error to the capture of cultural influence. 
10 Thus, the assignment came through the first names when a surname was not matched, or matched to several 
ethnicities. 
11 The first was developed by the Melissa Data Corporation, the second by List Services Direct, Inc. 
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Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian/Slavic, and Vietnamese. Appendix A discusses how we applied 
the matching process to the conference call sample in greater detail. 
Table 2, Panel A shows the distribution of the managers in our sample by ethnic group. 
Two thirds (= 16,831/24,901), of the managers in our sample are classified in the Anglo-Saxon 
ethnic group. Western Europe (EUR), Hispanic (HIS), and Indian/South Asian (IND) are the next 
largest ethnic groups. Anglo-Saxon managers make up a large portion of our sample because (i) a 
majority (111,071/129,787=85.6%, based on the first column of Panel B) of the firms in our sample 
are located in Anglo-Saxon countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the 
U.S.) and (ii) firms tend to hire local managers whose ethnic background matches that of the region 
where the firm is located (78% for Anglo-Saxons, 74% for the full sample).  
Table 2, Panel B shows the distribution of managers’ ethnic group within each of the firms’ 
ethnic regions. The table is structured so that each row (i.e., each firm’s ethnic region) adds up to 
100%. The high percentage in the diagonal of the matrix indicates that most firms hire managers 
within their own ethnic region. The figures range from 48% (for EUR) to 78% (for ENG), 
suggesting that most firms tend to hire managers with an ethnic background that matches the 
firm’s. However, there is still substantial variation in managers’ ethnic groups (i.e., the off-
diagonals). For example, for firms domiciled in Anglo-Saxon countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.), 78% of their managers are Anglo-Saxon, 13% are European, 
and 3% are Hispanic. We use off-diagonal observations to test our second and third hypotheses, 
and to check the robustness of our results in a single-country setting (the U.S.)  
Table 2, Panel C shows the distribution of managers’ ethnic groups by years. The number 
of managers shows a steady increase from 2002 to 2012. The dominance of Anglo-Saxon managers 
is more pronounced in the earlier years (i.e., 81% in 2002) but shows a steady decrease throughout 
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our sample period (i.e., 69% in 2012). Representation of other non-Anglo-Saxon ethnic groups, 
especially Hispanic (HIS), Indian/South Asian (IND), and Chinese (CHN), shows a steady increase 
throughout our sample period. 
3.2. Measures of individualism 
 
We measure the degree of individualism stemming from our sample managers’ cultural 
ethnicity using Hofstede’s (2001) individualism index. The index comes from a cross-country 
survey of employee values conducted between 1967 and 1973. The subjects of this survey were 
approximately 88,000 IBM employees in 72 countries. The individualism index was calculated 
from the country mean scores on 14 questions about the employees’ attitudes toward their work 
and private lives.12, 13 Hofstede’s measure has been validated, and used extensively in prior studies, 
including Chui et al. (2010) in the finance literature; Schultz et al. (1993) and Kachelmeier and 
Shehata (1997) in the accounting literature; and Franke et al. (1991), Yeh and Lawrence (1995), 
and Weber et al. (1996) in the economics literature. 
Hofstede’s measure is a country-level variable. However, each of the seven ethnic groups 
we obtain from Melinda’s classification scheme spans several countries. We therefore aggregate 
the individualism index to map into each ethnic group, using the average of the individualism 
index of all countries that belong to the ethnic group. We weigh the measure by the number of 
firms in each country (using our conference call sample). For example, to calculate the 
                                                          
12 Factor analysis was used to analyze the country mean scores on 14 work-goal questions and two factors were 
produced. The individualism index is constructed from the scores based on the first factor, which is highly correlated 
with 6 out of 14 work questions. The six questions include the following: (i) Have considerable freedom to adapt your 
own approach to the job; (ii) Have challenging work to do: work from which you can get a personal sense of 
accomplishment; (iii) Have a job which leaves you sufficient time for your personal or family life; (iv) Have training 
opportunities; (v) Have good physical working conditions; and (vi) Fully use your skills and abilities on the job 
(Hofstede 2001, p.256). 
13 Holfstede’s measures were based on a survey of IBM employees which may not be representative of cross cultural 
differences found outside of IBM. Several studies administered the questionnaires in other settings, using members of 
government and business leaders (Hoppe 1990), employees (Shane 1995), and consumers (deMooij 2001). All these 
studies were able to replicate the individualism measures of Hofstede. 
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individualism index of the Anglo-Saxon ethnic group, we average the individualism index of all 
countries where the dominant ethnicity is Anglo-Saxon (i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 
U.K., and the U.S.), weighted by the number of firms in each country. The countries included in 
each ethnic group are from Kerr (2008) and can be found in Table 2. We scale the individualism 
measure by 100 and present the measure in percentage terms. 
 Table 2 shows the individualism measure for each ethnic group. The ethnic group with the 
highest individualism measure is Anglo-Saxon, followed by European. Groups with a lower 
individualism measure are the South Korean and the Chinese. Japan scores highest on 
individualism among the East Asian countries.14 Overall, the ranking is consistent with findings in 
the psychology literature (Chang 2001). 
3.3. Measures of disclosure attributes 
 
We use three measures of disclosure attributes, which we expect to vary with managers’ 
cultural background. All measures are at the manager-call level. To construct the measures, we 
use all the answers of each manager during the Q&A session of a given conference call. The first 
one is tone, which we measure according to prior literature. Using the dictionary from Loughran 
and McDonald (2011), we count positive and negative words separately for each participant. We 
label the difference between positive and negative terms scaled by the sum of positive and negative 
words as Tone. Second, we count the number of times a manager uses singular first-person 
pronouns (“I”, “me”, “my”, “mine”, “myself”), scaled by total words spoken by the manager (Self-
Reference).15 Our third disclosure attribute measure is the degree to which managers tend to 
                                                          
14 Hofstede (2001) explains that while “Japanese society shows many of the characteristics of a collectivistic society: 
such as putting harmony of group and people have a strong sense of shame for losing face, it is not as collectivistic as 
most of her Asian neighbors. [The Japanese] are more private and reserved than most other Asians.” (http://geert-
hofstede.com/japan.html) 
15 The construct differs from self-attribution, which refers to attributing only favorable performance to internal causes 
and poor performance to external causes (Li 2012; Kimbrough and Wang 2014). We consider managers’ tendency to 
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apologize (Apologies). To measure Apologies, we count the number of times a manager says 
“sorry” or “apolog*”, and scale by the number of words used by the managers during the call. 
Table 3, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the four disclosure attributes. The mean 
and median Tone_Q&A indicate that, on average, managers use more positive than negative words. 
This is consistent with studies based on U.S. data (Davis et al. 2015). The mean Self-
Reference_Q&A is 1.52, and the mean Apologies_Q&A is 0.02. The median and third quartile are 
equal to zero, suggesting some skewness in the data, as most managers do not use apologetic words 
in their answers. Additionally, we report descriptive statistics for the disclosure attributes 
measured during the MD portion of the conference calls (also measured at the individual executive 
level). We later use those measures for comparison, since the effect of culture should be weaker—
if not muted—during scripted management discussions. 
Going back to Table 2, Panel A, where the mean disclosure attributes are reported 
separately by ethnicity, some patterns emerge. Tone tends to be more positive, and apologies less 
frequent, for ethnicities that are considered more individualistic. Since those descriptive statistics 
do not take into account differences in terms of underlying news, we design regression tests to 
examine our hypotheses in the next section.  
 
4. Empirical tests and results 
 
4.1 Disclosure attributes and individualism: Manager-level analysis 
We start out by examining whether cultural background (i.e., individualism) based on a 
manager’s ethnicity affects disclosure attributes. More specifically, we test whether managers from 
                                                          
use singular first-person pronouns in all situations regardless of whether the news is favorable or not. In other words, 
the tendency to use singular pronouns does not need to be self-serving. Gow et al. (2015) also count singular and 
plural first-person pronouns in earnings conference calls, and refer to them collectively as self-reference. We only 
focus on singular pronouns, as plural ones reflect greater collectivism. 
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more individualistic ethnic groups use a more optimistic tone, make fewer apologies, and use more 
singular first-person pronouns in their disclosure narratives (hypothesis 1). We use the following 
regression model with managers indexed as m, firms as i, and call quarters as t: 
Disclosure attributes (Tone_Q&A, Self-reference_Q&A, Apologies_Q&A)m,i,t  
= α0 + β1 Individualismm +∑ βj Manager controlj,m,t + ∑ βk Conference call controlk,i,t  
+ ∑ βl Firm controll,i,t  + ∑ βn Country controln,i,t + Industry FE+ Year FE + εm,i,t.          (1) 
 
The unit of analysis is manager (m) in calls of firm i in quarter t. The dependent variables are the 
three disclosure attributes discussed earlier in section 3.3, measured at the individual manager 
level.  
Individualismm is the individualism index of manager m.
 As discussed in section 3.2., the 
measure varies by ethnic group and takes higher values for groups that have a more individualistic 
culture. β1 is our main variable of interest; it captures the effect of a manager’s individualism on 
his/her disclosure attributes. The individualism measure is identified based on the manager’s 
ethnicity rather than the ethnic region where the firm is domiciled. This is because the behavioral 
attributes we examine are fundamentally an innate individual-level construct. 
We control for managerial characteristics that are known to affect disclosure policies 
(Davis et al. 2015). We include the executive’s gender, age, and educational background (Degree). 
We also include an indicator for CEOs (Li et al. 2014). Data on managerial characteristics are 
obtained from BoardEx by matching each individual-firm pair using first and last names. 16 
Additionally, we control for other properties of managers’ speech that are potentially correlated 
with their ethnic background and our disclosure attributes of interest. We use two measures of 
linguistic opacity, Plain English and Grammar Errors, which Brochet et al. (2016) find to be 
associated with the language distance between managers’ country of origin and English. Not all 
                                                          
16 Availability of such information in BoardEx is limited for firms outside the U.S. We therefore supplement the 
BoardEx data with internet searches (e.g., LinkedIn).  
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managers in the sample are native English speakers, and their choice of words in terms of tone, 
apologies or self-referencing may be a manifestation of their language barriers.  
We include various conference-call- and firm-level determinants of the level of 
transparency in the disclosure narratives. The count of total words (Words) and the number of 
analysts participating in the call (Participation) proxy for the amount of information released and 
the level of interest in the marketplace for the call, respectively. Firm size (Size), profitability 
(ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q) and Leverage proxy for various dimensions of business complexity, whereas 
the number of analysts covering the firm in I/B/E/S (Log Analysts) accounts for differences in the 
information environment driven by the demand side. The disclosure tone may also change with 
the properties of reported earnings and anticipated economic news. We control for the underlying 
earnings news using earnings surprise (ESUR), measured as the difference between the actual 
annual EPS minus the most recent mean analyst forecast (if available, a seasonal random walk 
model otherwise) scaled by price. We also include a loss dummy (D_loss) for firm-quarters with 
negative earnings and the stock returns during the fiscal year (Ret_fye). We also control for any 
fiscal year end effect using an indicator for calls held in the fourth quarter (year_end).  
Finally, we include various cultural, economic and institutional country-level determinants 
that may affect managers’ disclosure attributes. We include other dimensions of culture (Uncertainty 
avoidance, also from Hofstede (2001), and Lack of trust, from World Value Surveys) that have been 
shown to affect corporate policies (Pan et al. 2015).  We include financial development measures 
using the log of equity market capitalization (Market Cap) and the annual changes in the market 
index (Market Return). We include price synchronicity (Synchronicity) and Zero Returns to account 
for the transparency and liquidity of the information environment and the rule of law index (Law) to 
control for quality of institutions. All country-level controls are adjusted to reflect the ethnic region 
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of the individual using the method discussed in section 3.2. Alternatively, we restrict our sample to 
the U.S., thereby excluding country-level variables from the regression. Finally, we include year and 
industry fixed effects to account for unobserved factors that may affect disclosure attributes over 
time and across industries. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in Appendix B. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the study. The results from 
Panel B indicate that 6% of the managers in our sample are female and 10% have a post-graduate 
education. The average age is 52.77. The call and firm characteristics indicate that our sample 
consists of large firms with significant participation by managers (a mean of 1,041 words spoken by 
call/manager) and analysts (median of 7 (=e1.95) participants per call). We next present the estimated 
coefficients from our regression model in equation (1). We estimate the model using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and cluster the standard errors by firm and by year. Table 4 presents the results. 
Table 4, Panel A shows that a manager’s individualism is positively associated with 
Tone_Q&A and Self-Reference_Q&A, and negatively associated with the use of apologies 
(Apologies_Q&A). The estimated coefficient on Individualism is positive and significant, 0.091 (t-
stat=4.51) using Tone_Q&A in column 1. The results indicate that a one standard deviation increase 
in individualism (=0.20, Table 3 Panel B) is associated with a 0.018 higher Tone_Q&A. With our 
second disclosure attribute, Self-reference_Q&A, as the dependent variable in column 2, we also 
find a positive and significant coefficient of 0.174 (t-stat=4.47). For the apologies measure, we find 
a negative association between the level of managers’ individualism and the use of apologies (β1=-
0.015, t-stat=-6.20), as per column 3.  To compare the economic significance of the coefficients, we 
rerun the three regressions with standardized variables. The results indicate that a unit change in 
standardized individualism (a one standard deviation in individualism) is associated with a 3.5% 
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higher standardized tone, 3.6% higher standardized self-reference, and 4.1% fewer standardized 
apologies (not tabulated). 
Other manager characteristics exhibit significant associations with the disclosure attributes 
we examine. CEOs tend to speak more positively, use more singular first-person pronouns, and 
apologize less, on average. Female managers use less optimistic language and apologize more, 
consistent with women being less prone to overconfidence (Barber and Odean 2001). Older 
managers use more pessimistic tone, but they use more singular first-person pronouns, and apologize 
less. Several conference call and firm characteristics exhibit significant associations with disclosure 
attributes. Managers from larger firms use more pessimistic language but use more singular first-
person pronouns. As expected, managers use more optimistic tone when stock returns are higher, 
when they report profits and positive earnings surprises.  
In Table 4, Panel B, we restrict the sample to conference calls held by U.S. firms, in order to 
minimize the possibility that our results could be driven by unobserved country characteristics. All 
control variables—except for country characteristics—are included but not tabulated for 
succinctness. We find patterns consistent with the cross-country sample: Managers of U.S. firms 
who are from a relatively more individualistic ethnic background exhibit more positive tone (column 
1), self-reference (column 2), and make fewer apologies (column 3). The coefficients of interest are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Overall, the primary takeaway from Table 4 is that cultural 
background based on an individual’s ethnicity affects the disclosure attributes after controlling for 
other determinants of country-, firm-, and manager-level characteristics. 
4.2. Persistence of the effect of cultural individualism on disclosure attributes: Cross-cultural 
experience 
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Next, we examine individuals who are exposed to cultures outside their inherited ethnic 
region. If inherited ethnic culture is long lasting, the disclosure attributes of executives will 
continue to show patterns consistent with their inherited cultural backgrounds, even for individuals 
who are exposed to different cultural environments. If the culture acquired through subsequent 
organizational practices dominates the individual’s inherited ethnic culture, the disclosure 
attributes of individuals with cross-cultural experience may no longer show influences of the 
manager’s inherited ethnic culture. Our hypothesis is that managers exposed to different cultures 
express themselves in a way that is in between those two scenarios. That is, their ethnic culture 
influences their disclosure attributes, but less so if they are subsequently exposed to a different 
culture (H2).  
To test this hypothesis, we separate our sample between local managers and those with 
cross-cultural experience. Managers are classified as local if their ethnicity matches that of the 
dominant ethnicity in the country where their firm is headquartered (i.e., if they are on the diagonal 
in Table 2, Panel A), and cross-cultural (i.e., off diagonal) otherwise. In both samples, β1 is the 
coefficient of interest. The β1 coefficients in the local manager sample form a base-line estimate 
of the effect of ethnic cultural. Our interest is twofold: First, is β1 positive and significant in the 
cross-cultural sample? That would suggest managers’ inherited individualism continues to affect 
their disclosure, even if they are exposed to organizational cultures outside of their cultural 
upbringing. Second, according to H2, we expect β1 to be significantly greater (more negative for 
apologies) in the local than in the cross-cultural sample. 
Table 5, Panel A shows the estimated coefficients for the full sample, 74% of which 
consists of local managers. The coefficient on Individualism is positive and significant when the 
dependent variable is Tone_Q&A, both for local and cross-cultural managers (columns 1 and 2). 
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However, the effect for local managers (=0.273) is significantly larger than for cross-cultural ones 
(=0.092), as per the F-test (p=0.02). Hence, while managers’ inherited cultural individualism still 
matters in shaping their disclosure tone once they are exposed to a different culture, the effect is 
partly muted, consistent with H2. Similar to Tone_Q&A, Self-Reference_Q&A is positively and 
significantly associated with Individualism in both samples, (0.372 for local managers, 0.162 for 
cross-cultural managers), but with no significant difference between the two samples (p=0.27 for 
the F-test). A similar pattern emerges with Apologies_Q&A as the dependent variable, and the F-
test also rejects the null of equality between the two coefficients. 
Hence, a mixed picture emerges from Table 5, Panel A. Judging solely from the 
coefficients on the disclosure attributes in the cross-cultural sample, managers’ inherited cultural 
background persists in shaping their disclosure attributes. The comparison with local managers 
indicates that the effect is partly muted when managers are exposed to a different culture, but only 
significantly so for tone. This result suggests that while inherited culture has a lasting effect, 
neither inherited nor acquired culture “dominates” the other per se. 
To maintain the approach used in Table 4, we also report results based on the U.S. sample in 
Table 5, Panel B. However, we can only report cross-cultural ones, since there is no within-country 
variation in Individualism for local managers. Consistent with the full sample, we find that cross-
cultural (i.e., non-Anglo-Saxon) managers who work for U.S. firms exhibit a positive (negative) and 
significant association between their inherited cultural background in terms of individualism, and 
their disclosure tone and self-reference (propensity to apologize). Overall, the results in Table 5 
indicate that the effect of inherited culture on disclosure attributes persists for managers that work 
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for firms located in regions where another culture dominates, but the effect on tone and self-reference 
is partly diluted.17 
4.3. Variation in disclosure attributes within firms with high ethnic diversity: Firm-level analysis 
The results thus far indicate that individual managers speak during conference calls in a 
way that reflects their cultural background. We next examine whether culturally diverse 
management teams exhibit greater within-firm variation in their disclosure attributes. If a 
managers’ tone remains unaffected by others in the management team, firms with a diverse ethnic 
team will show greater within-firm variation in the tone among managers. Our results indicating 
that the effect of inherited culture on a manager’s disclosures survives exposure to other cultures 
suggests this should occur. However, it is also possible that the hiring/training process of top 
managers is such that managers are made to speak in ways that is more consistent with the overall 
tone of the management team. We use the following model to address that question: 
 Standard Deviation of Disclosure attributes (Tone, Self-reference, Apologies)m,i,t  
= α0 + β1 Ethnic Diversitym + ∑ βk Conference call controlk,i,t + ∑ βl Firm controll,i,t   
+ ∑ βn Country controln,i,t + Industry FE+ Year FE + εm,i,t.          (2) 
The unit of observation is a firm-year. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of 
the disclosure attributes measured at the manager-level within each firm-year. The main variable 
of interest, Ethnic Diversity, indicates firm-years with at least one manager whose ethnicity does 
not match that of the rest of the team. If individual managers’ cultural ethnicity results in disclosure 
attributes that reflect more idiosyncratic style, then we should observe a more dissonant message 
                                                          
17 Managers can also be exposed to different cultures through their education. In untabulated analysis, we examine the 
effect of inherited versus acquired culture on managers’ disclosure for managers who studied at a university/institution 
located in a country where the dominant culture differs from that of their ethnicity, and ‘local’ otherwise we find that 
managers with cross-cultural educational background exhibit a weaker association between their inherited culture and 
disclosure patterns. This suggests either that those who self-select into studying abroad are less influenced by their 
home culture to begin with, or that exposure to different cultures in an academic environment has some mitigating 
effect on the cultural dimension of disclosure choices.  
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in ethnically diverse teams. That is, the coefficient on Ethnic Diversity should be positive. 
Compared to the manager-level tests, we also add stock return and earnings volatility, and the 
magnitude of accruals as controls. All three measures capture dimensions of uncertainty, which 
should be positively associated with dispersion in managers’ disclosures. 
Table 6 reports the results of the OLS estimates of Model (2). In the first column, the 
dependent variable is the standard deviation of tone. The coefficient on Ethnic Diversity is positive 
(0.033) and significant (p<0.01). Hence, ethnically diverse management teams exhibit more 
dispersion in their disclosure tone. In terms of economic significance, having a diverse 
management team leads to an 8% (=0.033/0.43) increase in the standard deviation of tone relative 
to the sample mean. We find qualitatively similar results with self-reference and apologies. There 
is significantly greater dispersion in self-reference and apologies among ethnically diverse teams 
than homogenous ones.18 Panel B repeats the analysis using U.S. firms only. The results largely 
echo those of Panel A. Altogether, the results in Table 6 suggest that the effect of cultural ethnicity 
on managers’ disclosure attributes leads to more within-firm dispersion in disclosure attributes 
when management team members hail from different cultures. Hence, culture appears to affect not 
only the first but also second moment in disclosure attributes. 
4.4. Management discussion (MD) portions of the calls 
The analysis thus far is based on managers’ answers to analysts’ questions during conference 
calls. As discussed in H3, we expect the level of spontaneity of those extemporaneous disclosures 
to reveal the effect of culture on managers’ word choices. In contrast, the likely more scripted (and 
                                                          
18 In additional analysis (untabulated), we repeat the test using the management discussion section of the calls. We 
find that the effect of ethnic diversity is positive and significant (0.022= for presentation tone, t-stat=7.116) but the 
magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than the 0.033 for the Q&A section (p-value of F-test =0.0123). The findings 
suggest that there are stronger institutional forces in the presentation sections which can mute the effect of an 
individual manager’s ethnic background and promote a tone that is more homogeneous across the management team. 
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even created by a group of individuals other than the speaker) MD portion of the call should exhibit 
less (or no) variation due to managers’ individual culture. We test H3 by estimating Model (1) based 
on managers’ speech during the MDs. For completeness, we also test whether the overall effect of 
culture persists or is muted once we combine the MD and Q&A.  
Table 7 reports the results. In Panel A, the sample includes all countries. For each disclosure 
attribute, we report three regression results: The Q&A (identical to Table 4), the MD, and the entire 
call. For Tone_MD, the coefficient on Individualism is negative and significant (= -0.0065, t-stat=-
3.719) during the MD. This is in sharp contrast to the positive coefficient (=0.091, t-stat=4.507) in 
the Q&A. It suggests that managers go against their cultural background (or are coached to do so) 
in the prepared MD. On balance, the insignificant coefficient on Individualism in the third column 
suggests that the cultural component of tone is muted when the entire conference call is taken into 
account. 
Similarly, for Self-reference_MD the coefficient on Individualism is negative (= -0.028, t-
stat=-0.938) in column 5, although insignificant. That is, we find no evidence that managers from 
more individualistic culture self-refer more during the MD. When we combine the MD and the 
Q&As, the cultural influence of self-referencing persists even after taking the MD into account, as 
indicated by the marginally significant coefficient on Individualism (=0.054, t-stat=1.779) in column 
6. Lastly, as per the negative and significant coefficient on Individualism (=-0.001, t-stat=-2.460) in 
column 8, culturally individualistic managers also apologize less frequently during MDs. While 
consistent with the Q&A results, the coefficient is much smaller than in column 7. Regardless, the 
cultural component of Apologies endures when measured over the entire call (column 9). Overall, 
the effect of cultural individualism on disclosure appears to be either muted or reversed during MDs, 
where managers’ individual characteristics are less likely to come through.   
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We also run the analysis for U.S. firms only in Panel B. Several noteworthy results emerge. 
First, the coefficient on Individualism for Tone_MD, in column 2 remains negative. Hence, the result 
in Panel A is not solely due to firms/managers from collectivist culture injecting more positive tone 
in their management discussions. The results hold even within a single country-level institutional 
environment. In other words, our findings cannot be explained by other cross-country differences 
(e.g., litigation risk) that may differentially affect disclosure outcomes (Rogers et al. 2011).  
Second, in column 5, the coefficient on Individualism is positive and significant, suggesting 
that U.S. managers are more likely to self-refer during MDs as well. Lastly, Individualism does not 
have a statistically significant bearing on U.S. managers’ propensity to apologize, as per column 8. 
Altogether, the results in Table 7 indicate that during MDs, managers do not express themselves in 
a way that reflects their cultural individualism, consistent with H3. The contrasting results between 
Q&As and prepared remarks suggest that managers and/or firms are not entirely passive vis-à-vis 
the effect of culture on word choice. 
4.5. Capital market tests 
Having established that disclosure attributes vary with managers’ cultural backgrounds, we 
next examine how listeners—i.e., investors—respond to the disclosure patterns of managers from 
different cultural backgrounds by examining stock returns during conference calls. We focus on 
tone as our variable of interest, because its association with firm performance is least ambiguous, 
and has been examined in the U.S. (e.g., Huang et al. 2014). We use intraday data to examine the 
market responses separately for the MD and the Q&A section. Thus, we limit the analysis to U.S. 
firms, for which the TAQ database provides intraday data. 
We use the following regression model to test the investors’ reaction to the calls: 
CARi,t = α0 + β1 Tonei,t + β2 Tonei,t × Low Individualism+ α1 Low Individualism 
+ ∑ βj Conference call controlj,i,t + ∑ βk Firm controlk,i,t 
+ ∑ βl Country controll,i,t + Industry FE+ Year FE + εi,t.          (3) 
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Subscripts i and t indicate firms and quarters, respectively. One challenge with the capital 
market test is that we can only measure market reactions at the firm-level whereas the disclosure 
attributes used so far were constructed at the manager-level. We modify the disclosure measure by 
aggregating it across executives who speak during a firm i call in quarter t (or during the portion 
of interest). Hence, Tone is now defined as the positive minus negative words of all managers that 
spoke during the call scaled by the total number of positive and negative words.  
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted return (CAR) during the conference call, or 
a portion thereof (Q&A or MD, depending on the specification). We estimate the start and end 
times of the call and portions thereof using the methodology described in Matsumoto et al. (2011). 
Transcripts from StreetEvents and Factset include time stamps for conference call starts. 
Matsumoto et al. (2011) estimate that, on average, the introductory remarks last 116 seconds, while 
the MD and Q&A lengths can be inferred from a pace of 160 and 157 words spoken per minute, 
respectively. 
We expect a positive β2: The more positive the tone, the higher the return during the call. 
Our variable of interest is the interaction between tone and the low individualism indicator, which 
equals one if the firm’s mean individualism is above the country’s median individualism. We make 
no prediction for the sign, but note that if investors give more credence to the positive tone of 
managers from more collectivist ethnic groups, we would observe a stronger response to the tone 
of firms with more managers from a collectivist ethnic group. As in the determinants test, we 
control for call-, firm-, and country-level characteristics that have been shown and/or are likely to 
be associated with stock returns and analyst forecast revisions around earnings announcements 
and conference calls. The most important controls are the earnings surprise, and the indicator for 
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negative earnings. Both will be correlated with the dependent variable and the independent 
variables of interest. 
Table 8 Panel A reports the results from the OLS estimation of Model (3) using all countries 
in the sample. The first two columns present results using returns during the Q&A session as the 
dependent variable. In column 1, the coefficient on Tone is positive and statistically significant 
(=0.15, t-stat=2.80), which indicates that conference call Q&As with a more positive tone elicit 
higher short-window stock returns. The findings suggest that a one standard deviation increase in 
tone (= 0.51, Table 3) is associated with 8 more basis points. This holds after controlling for the 
positive effect of the earnings surprise, and the negative effect of negative earnings. However, 
when we add an indicator for less individualistic managers (Low Individualism Indicator) and its 
interaction with tone, we do not find an incremental effect, as per the insignificant coefficient on 
Tone_Q&A*Low Individualism in column 2. A similar pattern emerges during the MD portion of 
the call. The coefficient on Tone_MD is positive and significant (=0.10, t-stat=2.49), but not on 
the interaction with Low Individualism. Consistent with the separate Q&A and MD results, the 
combined return/tone association is positive and significant, but does not differ based on the 
cultural background of the management team. Hence, we fail to find evidence that investors adjust 
for cultural differences in tone when reacting to earnings conference calls. 
 
5. Additional tests  
5.1. An alternative measure of individualism and other robustness tests 
In this section, we examine whether our findings hold once we use an alternative measure 
of individualism attributable to genetic transmission. Following prior economic studies on 
individualism, we use differences in blood type prevalence across ethnicities as a proxy for a 
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genetic-based mechanism of cultural transmission (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2010, 2011). These 
studies argue that because blood type is a neutral genetic marker, i.e., one that has no effect on 
other attributes of individuals, it captures the genetic component of culture that is independent of 
other social transmission channels. 19 
Following this literature, we create a measure of individualism that can be explained by 
the variation in blood type differences across ethnic groups. More specifically, we construct a 
measure of Blood Type Distance, the Euclidian distance between the blood type mix of an ethnic 
group and that of Anglo-Saxons, the most individualistic ethnicity in our sample. We obtain ethnic-
level blood type data from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). In our first-stage model, the coefficient on 
Blood Type Distance is negative and significant, indicating that ethnicities with a blood type mix 
that is more distant from that of the Anglo-Saxon population exhibit less individualism. 
Furthermore, with an R2 of 80%, the first stage estimates (untabulated) indicates that our measure 
of genetic-based mechanism of cultural transition is strongly correlated with individualism. 
We re-run our main analysis by replacing Individualism with its predicted value from the 
first stage. Table 9, Panel A, reports the results. In terms of sign, magnitude, and statistical 
significance, the coefficients on Predicted Individualism are consistent with the OLS results. That 
is, executives with higher predicted individualism attributable to their ethnicity’s blood type use 
more optimistic tone, greater self-reference, and make fewer apologies. This suggests that our 
findings hold when we use only the genetically-transmitted component of culture. 
                                                          
19 Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010, 2011) use this variable as an instrument arguing that blood type satisfies the 
exclusion restriction criterion because it is a neutral genetic marker, i.e., one that has no effect on attributes that should 
impact financial economic outcomes. Subsequent studies, however, challenge the validity of this instrument because 
genetic composition may be correlated with variables other than ethnic cultures, which may affect the outcome 
variable (Giuliano et al. 2013). We also note that this is a difficult—if not impossible—claim to ascertain. If 
individuals inherit traits genetically and culturally from their parents in ways that are highly correlated, then the impact 
of culture on disclosure is not distinguishable from that of genes. Hence, our two stage tests may be more 
conservatively interpreted as being based on blood type as an alternative measure of individualism to that of Hofstede.    
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Another potential concern with manager-level analyses is the possibility that unobserved 
firm-level factors drive the observed association between manager characteristics and the outcome 
of interest. We supplement our tests using firm fixed effects and a change instead of level 
specification.  
Under the firm fixed effect specification, the coefficient on Individualism will capture 
within-firm (but across-manager) variation in disclosure attributes due to managers’ cultural 
background. The results are tabulated in Table 9, Panel B. In terms of sign and statistical 
significance, the coefficients on Individualism remain generally robust to the inclusion of firm fixed 
effects. In terms of magnitude, the coefficients are generally smaller than in Table 4, Panel A. 
Nevertheless, the results indicate that within a given firm, managers from a more individualistic 
ethnic background use more optimistic tone, and apologize less than those from a more collectivist 
background.  
Under the change specification, using firm-quarter data, we take within-firm first 
differences (compared to the previous call) in all variables of interest (disclosure attributes and 
individualism of the management team) and controls that also vary over time. ΔIndividualism will 
vary if the management teams ethnic mix changes from one call to another, primarily due to 
executive turnover. The results are tabulated in Table 9, Panel C. In columns 1 and 3, the 
coefficient on ΔIndividualism is positive (negative) and significant: when the management team is 
ethnically more individualistic than in the previous call held by the same firm, tone is significantly 
higher, and apologies lower. Although positive, the coefficient on Self-reference is not significant. 
We obtain similar results when we only keep observations with non-zero changes in individualism 
(not tabulated).  
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Finally, we test whether the effect of culture on disclosure attributes persists across good 
and bad news partitions. An underlying assumption in our hypothesis is that the effect of 
individualism on a manager’s disclosure attributes stems from inherited cultural traits. If so, we 
would expect the effect to persist even if the manager is exposed to situational forces that could 
lead him/her to deviate from this cultural norm. However, it is possible that managers’ disclosure 
incentives vary depending on whether they communicate good or bad news, especially when it 
comes to self-attribution (Kimbrough and Wang 2014). We repeat our earlier analysis in Table 4 
by looking at positive and negative earnings surprises separately. Earnings surprise is defined as 
the difference between the actual annual EPS minus the most recent mean analyst forecast, if 
available, or a seasonal random walk model otherwise. 
Table 9, Panel D reports the results. Across all partitions, the coefficients are consistent 
with the full sample results. That is, Individualism is positively associated with Tone, and Self- 
Reference, and negatively associated with Apologies, regardless of whether the earnings news is 
positive or negative.20 Furthermore, the coefficients are all statistically significant, and the F-tests 
indicate that we cannot reject the null of coefficient equality across good and bad news partitions. 
Hence, the effect of cultural individualism on disclosure attributes holds regardless of the 
underlying news, suggesting a persistent phenomenon.  
5.2 Measurement error 
We perform several robustness tests to further mitigate concerns related to measurement 
errors. First, we include indicators for managers whose names cannot be attributed with certainty 
to a unique ethnicity. The ethnicity-name matching algorithm yields a probability distribution of 
                                                          
20 One could argue that individualistic managers should be less likely to use self-referencing language when earnings 
news is bad. However, our results do not support the view that self-referencing language is necessarily self-serving. 
Rather, the cultural dimension of self-reference appears to be an unconditional tendency to talk more in the first person 
or from the firm’s standpoint.     
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the matching ethnic groups based on the manager’s first and surnames, giving priority to surnames. 
However, it is possible that two managers with the same surname are match to different ethnic 
origins. This occurs when the surname is not matched (or was matched with several ethnicities), 
and the assignments came through first names.21 To address the possibility that those may be 
erroneous matches, we create a variable based on the number of ethnicities that a given surname 
can be matched with in our sample (# of Ethnicities). We include this variable and its interaction 
with Individualism in our tests. Table 10, Panel A, reports the results (control variables are included 
but not tabulated). We find that our main results remain qualitatively unaffected by the inclusion 
of # of Ethnicities and its interaction with Individualism.  
Measurement error can also occur with female managers who change their name through 
marriage and whose spouse is from a different ethnicity. To address this issue, we rerun our tests 
without female managers. Table 10, Panel B, reports the results (control variables are included but 
not tabulated). The results are robust to this exclusion. 
Lastly, we further control for the disclosure attributes during the MD portion of the calls, 
where each speaker is also separately identified. For example, when a manager’s Q&A tone is on 
the left-hand side, that same manager’s MD tone is added as a control on the right-hand side. Table 
10, Panel C, reports the results. Across all disclosure attributes, the coefficient on the MD part is 




We examine the effect of managers’ cultural background on their disclosure narrative in 
the context of earnings conference calls. Using managers’ ethnicity to infer their cultural 
                                                          
21 Last names that are matched to more than one ethnic origin are less than 10% of our sample. 
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upbringing, we test whether executives from a more individualistic (as opposed to collectivist) 
background speak in a more optimistic and self-confident manner during conference calls. Our 
sample consists of English-language conference calls held by firms from around the world.  
Our primary finding is that managers from a more individualistic background use a more 
positive tone, more singular first-person pronouns, and make fewer apologies relative to managers 
from a collectivist ethnicity. The results are specific to the Q&A portion of the conference calls, 
where individual managers’ cultural roots are more likely to have an effect. In contrast, the cultural 
effect of inherited individualism is largely absent from the less extemporaneous MD part of the 
call, and even reversed in the case of tone. While we find that the inherited culture of managers 
who are exposed to another culture through work or education has a somewhat weaker effect on 
their disclosure tone, our tests otherwise indicate that the effect of culture on disclosure optimism 
and self-confidence is sticky, including across partitions on positive and negative earnings news. 
Additionally, we find that firms with culturally diverse management teams exhibit greater 
dispersion in their disclosure across managers. This suggests that culture not only affects the first, 
but also the second moment of the distribution of firms’ disclosure tone, managerial self-reference, 
and apologies.  
Lastly, we provide some evidence on the capital market effects of disclosure attributes in 
a cross-country setting. We find that disclosure tone elicits more positive short-window stock 
returns around conference calls, and the effect of tone does not differ across culturally diverse and 
‘purely’ local teams. Hence, the evidence suggests that market participants do not adjust their 
interpretation of disclosure tone for firm value based on the cultural background of the 
management team.  
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Our results speak to the role played by culture in shaping corporate disclosure narratives. 
We add to and bring together several strands of literature that examine (a) the textual content of 
corporate disclosures and its capital market consequences and (b) the role of culture in explaining 
capital market outcomes. We also innovate beyond prior literature by using managers’ ethnic 
background and a cross-country earnings conference call sample to perform our empirical tests. 
Our findings should prove useful to academic and practitioner audiences who wish to better 
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Appendix A: Ethnicity-name matching 
We map executive names into each ethnic group using the ethnicity-name matching technique developed 
by Kerr (2008). The matching process exploits the fact that people with particular first names and surnames 
are likely to be of a certain ethnicity. The underlying pool of ethnic names is based on the database of two 
marketing companies, Melissa Data Corporation, and List Services Direct, Inc., that developed the database 
for use in direct-mail advertisements. While other data vendors provide similar services, the advantage of 
the database provided by these companies is in their identification of Asian ethnicities, especially Chinese, 
Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian/Slavic, and Vietnamese names (Kerr 2008). 
We obtain the executives’ first and last names from the conference call transcripts. The matching procedure 
utilizes all of the name assignments in the database and assigns a probability distribution of each name, 
giving first priority to last names. 23 If a last name is assigned to all ethnic groups with a zero probability 
(or equal probabilities among multiple ethnicities), the algorithm then uses the first name to generate the 
match. The match rate following this procedure was at 96%, which is comparable to the match rate found 
in other studies (Foley and Kerr 2013).24 
The technique classifies each name into nine distinct ethnic groups: Anglo-Saxon, Chinese, European, 
Hispanic/Filipino, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian/Slavic, and Vietnamese. When applied to the 
conference call sample, no executives matched to the Vietnamese ethnic group. Thus, our analysis includes 
eight distinct groups.  Table A1 shows the top five surnames of executives in each ethnic group.  
 










Hispanic/Filipino Japanese Korean Russian/Slavic 
Top 1 Chen  Smith Schwartz Shah Garcia Tanaka Kim Kaminski 
2 Wang Johnson Schmidt Patel Lopez Suzuki Park Brodsky 
3 Wong Miller Weiss Singh Sanchez Kato Choi Lasky 
4 Chan Brown Meyer Kumar Fernandez Santo Cho  Khaykin 
Top 5 Li Jones Wagner Gupta Perez Takahashi Jung Radinsky 
 
  
                                                          
23 See Kerr (2008) for more details on the matching process. 
24 The list obtained from Kerr (2010) excludes Jewish names (the most prominent examples being Cohen, Katz, etc.), 
due to difficulties in classifying the individuals. For this reason, we exclude firms domiciled in Israel from our 
conference call sample. 
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Appendix B: Variable definitions  
Panel A Definitions of the variables   
Category Variable name Empirical measure & data source 
Dependent 
Variables   
Tone_Q&A(MD) The number of times the manager uses “positive” words minus 
the number of times the manager uses “negative” words scaled 
by the total number of “positive” plus “negative” words during 
the Q&A (MD). 
Self-Reference_Q&A (MD) 
 
The number of times the manager uses singular first-person 
pronouns (“I”, ”me”, “mine”, “my”, “myself”) during the Q&A 
(MD) scaled by the total number of words. 
Apologies_Q&A(MD) The number of times the manager apologizes (“apolog*”, 
“sorry”)) during the Q&A (MD) scaled by the total number of 
words. 
Standard deviation in tone The standard deviation of Tone of all executives in a firm 
computed annually using transcripts in each firm-year. 
Standard deviation in self-
reference 
The standard deviation of Self-reference of all executives in a 
firm computed annually using transcripts in each firm-year. 
Standard deviation in apologies The standard deviation of Apologies of all executives in a firm 
computed annually using transcripts in each firm-year. 




Gender Indicator equal to 1 if the manager is female, 0 otherwise. 
Age Age of the manager. 
Degree Indicator equal to 1 if the manager obtained a graduate degree, 
0 otherwise. 
 Same ethnicity Indicator equal to 1 if the forecast is issued by an analyst with 




 Words The number of words in the Q&A section. 
 Participants Number of non-corporate participants in the call. 
 Size Log market value of equity measured in U.S. dollars. 
 Q Log market value of assets over the book value of assets. 
 Leverage Total debt over the book value of assets. 
 ROA Net income before extraordinary items over the total value of 
assets. 
 ESUR Difference between the actual annual EPS minus the most 
recent mean analyst forecast, if available, or a seasonal 
random walk model otherwise scaled by price. We use decile 
ranks scaled to range between zero and one. 
 Log analysts Log of the number of analysts covering the firm. 
 D_loss Indicator variable equal to 1 for firms reporting negative 
earnings. 
 Year_end Indicator variable equal to 1 for conference calls 
corresponding to the fourth fiscal quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
 Ret_fye Prior fiscal year return. 
 Return volatility Yearly standard deviation of daily abnormal returns in the 
year prior to the conference call. 
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 Earnings volatility 5 year standard deviation of net income (minimum 3 years of 
data required) scaled by total assets. The five-year window 
ends with the fiscal year of the conference call. 
 Replag Time from the firm’s fiscal year end to the conference call 
date. 
 
Appendix B: Variable definitions (Continued) 
 
Category Variable name Empirical measure & data source 
Country 
characteristics   
Individualism Average of Hofstede’s country-level individualism index by 
ethnicity. The measure is retrieved from  
http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html.  
Language distance Distance between English and the main language of each country 
studied, based on a 5-point scale classification system (see Lewis 
(2009) for details at http://www.ethnologue.com/web.asp). 
Lack of trust Skepticism index from the World Values Survey. The measure is 
retrieved from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
Uncertainty avoidance Hofstede’s country-level Uncertainty Avoidance Index retrieved 
from http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html. 
Market cap Equity market capitalization of the country’s global Datastream 
Index. 
 Market return Annual change in the Datastream global market index. 
 Synchronicity National average firm-level measure of synchronicity following 
Morck et al. (2000).  Synchronicity =log(R2/(1-R2) where R2 is 
obtained from the yearly market model regression of daily returns. 
 Zero returns Yearly country average firm-level percentage of daily zero returns. 
 Accrual Country’s average accruals. Accruals is defined as change in (current 
assets-change in current liabilities –change in cash + change in short 
term debt - depreciation)/ average total assets.  





Table 1 Sample selection 
  
# of conference 
calls 





   
Number of conference call transcripts 2002-2012 332,038 1,008,503 
Less: Analyst calls, etc. 110,135 249,216 
Less: Missing identifiers, Years 142,387 515,762 
 79,516 243,525 
Less: Incomplete financials, returns 15,523 36,630 
Less: Missing country’s ethnicity (Israel) 719 1,924 
Less: Countries with fewer than 30 observations 73 240 
 63,201 204,731 
Less: Missing Managers Information (i.e. ethnicity, linguistic 
measures) and short conference calls 
5,432 74,871 
Less: Translated calls 29 73 
Total number of observations 57,740 129,787 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistic of manager’s cultural background based on ethnicity 







% of managers with ethnic 
cultural background identical to 
the firm's region 
Mean disclosure attributes 
Tone Self-reference Apologies 
Anglo-Saxon ENG 89.51 16,831 77% 0.159 1.552 0.021 
European EUR 65.76 4,156 48% 0.088 1.500 0.027 
Japanese JAP 46.00 175 44% 0.076 1.381 0.041 
Indian/South Asian IND 42.16 754 67% 0.108 1.493 0.025 
Russian/Slavic RUS 39.00 428 53% 0.089 1.328 0.027 
Hispanic HIS 33.16 1,523 69% 0.091 1.322 0.033 
Chinese CHN 20.41 899 64% 0.087 1.291 0.037 
South Korean KOR 18.00 135 77% -0.003 1.518 0.036 
Total   24,901 74% 0.139 1.519 0.023 
 
Panel B Distribution of the ethnic group of managers, by firm’s region 
Firm's region\ Manager's ethnic group 
# of m-
quarters 
ENG EUR JAP IND RUS HIS CHN KOR Total 
U.S., UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada 111,071 78% 13% 0% 2% 1% 3% 3% 0% 100% 
Europe 13,682 36% 48% 0% 1% 2% 11% 1% 0% 100% 
Japan 391 37% 6% 44% 2% 2% 3% 4% 2% 100% 
India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan 932 22% 4% 0% 67% 2% 3% 1% 0% 100% 
Russia/Slavic 288 44% 2% 0% 0% 53% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Hispanic Nations 2,409 18% 11% 0% 0% 1% 69% 0% 0% 100% 
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan 852 21% 3% 1% 6% 0% 4% 64% 2% 100% 




Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel C Distribution of the ethnic group of managers, by year 
Call- year 
\ Manager's ethnic group 




2002 81.1% 14.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 1.5% 0.0% 2,534 
2003 77.5% 13.3% 0.5% 2.5% 0.0% 4.4% 1.6% 0.2% 5,837 
2004 73.5% 15.3% 0.4% 2.7% 1.7% 4.8% 1.4% 0.3% 8,644 
2005 72.9% 16.2% 0.5% 2.1% 1.8% 4.5% 1.8% 0.2% 8,444 
2006 72.2% 16.8% 0.6% 2.1% 1.5% 4.4% 2.1% 0.3% 9,586 
2007 70.5% 17.2% 1.0% 2.1% 1.5% 4.4% 3.0% 0.3% 10,914 
2008 70.4% 18.1% 0.7% 2.0% 1.5% 4.4% 2.8% 0.2% 12,813 
2009 69.1% 17.2% 0.6% 2.3% 1.4% 5.1% 4.0% 0.2% 13,547 
2010 69.3% 16.7% 0.6% 2.4% 1.7% 5.4% 3.6% 0.4% 15,989 
2011 70.8% 15.8% 0.5% 3.2% 1.5% 5.1% 2.6% 0.4% 19,787 
2012 68.9% 15.3% 0.4% 4.0% 1.7% 6.2% 3.1% 0.4% 21,692 
 
Notes: This table describes our sample. Unless otherwise noted, the unit of observation is a manager-conference call pair. Managers are assigned to one of eight ethnicities (a ninth 
ethnicity, Vietnamese, had no match in our sample) according to Kerr (2008) and based on a database from Melissa Data Corp. and List Services Direct Inc. See Appendix A and 
Kerr (2008) for more details. Panel A reports statistical means for our main variables of interest. We obtain the individualism measure from Hofstede (2001). Since Hofstede’s data 
is at the country level, we convert individualism to an ethnicity-level measure using the average of the individualism index of all countries that belong to the ethnic group. We weight 
the measure by the number of firms in each country (using our conference call sample). See Appendix B for detailed definitions of disclosure attributes Tone, Self-Reference, and 
Apologies. In Panel B, the countries included in each firm’s regions is as the following: Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Hispanic Nations include Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Russia include Russia and all Soviet Union 
Countries. Panel C reports the sample breakdown by year and ethnicity.  
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of disclosure attributes 
Variable N Mean ST Dev P10 P25 P50  P75 P90 
Tone_Q&A 129,787 0.14 0.52 -0.60 -0.14 0.20 0.50 0.80 
Self-reference_Q&A 129,787 1.52 0.96 0.35 0.86 1.42 2.05 2.76 
Apologies_Q&A 129,787 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Tone_MD 105,311 0.26 0.42 -0.33 0.00 0.31 0.57 0.75 
Self-reference_MD 105,311 0.66 0.61 0.15 0.29 0.51 0.85 1.32 
Apologies_MD 105,311 0.004 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the capital market variables and other call characteristics 
  N Mean ST Dev P10 P25 P50  P75 P90 
Capital market reaction 
Abn. Ret. Q&A,t % 15,533 -0.02 1.71 -1.38 -0.48 0.00 0.46 1.33 
Abn. Ret. Pres.,t % 15,533 0.00 1.64 -1.24 -0.43 0.00 0.42 1.24 
 
Individualismm 129,787 0.78 0.20 0.42 0.66 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Genderm 78,506 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Agem,t 75,886 52.77 8.00 42.41 47.35 52.62 58.13 62.83 
Degreem 27,583 0.10 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Plain Englishm,t 129,787 0.09 1.80 -1.80 -1.00 -0.10 0.93 2.10 






112.00 283.00 700.00 1,465.0
0 
2,450.0
0 Participantsi,t 129,787 1.86 0.53 1.10 1.61 1.95 2.20 2.48 
Sizei,t 129,787 13.45 1.93 11.04 12.25 13.41 14.64 16.05 
Qi,t 129,787 1.79 1.33 0.93 1.05 1.32 1.97 3.22 
Leveragei,t 129,787 0.23 0.38 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.35 0.53 
ROAi,t 129,787 -0.01 0.19 -0.15 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.12 
ESURi,t 129,787 0.49 0.32 0.00 0.22 0.56 0.78 1.00 
Log analystsi,t 129,787 1.40 0.95 0.00 0.69 1.61 2.08 2.56 
D_lossi,t 129,787 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Year_endi,t 129,787 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Ret_fyei,t 129,787 0.19 0.69 -0.48 -0.19 0.09 0.38 0.84 
Return volatilityi,t 57,740 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Earnings volatilityi,t 57,740 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.20 
Replagi,t 57,740 14.33 101.11 15.50 25.00 33.00 41.00 59.00 
 
Lack of trustc(m) 129,787 0.39 0.05 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.42 
Uncertainty c(m), t 
avoidancec(m) 
129,787 51.18 11.28 46.27 46.27 46.27 46.27 63.18 
Market capc,t 129,787 9.28 6.09 0.52 1.42 11.55 14.40 16.34 
Market returnc,t 129,787 0.08 0.20 -0.28 0.01 0.14 0.17 0.28 
Synchronicityc,t 129,787 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.17 
Zero returnsc,t 129,787 0.39 0.06 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.40 0.48 
Lawc 129,787 9.69 1.23 9.23 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables in our regression analyses. See Appendix B for 
detailed variable definitions.
 Table 4 Effect of manager's ethnic background on disclosure attributes 
Panel A Cross-country sample 
Variables 
(1) Tone_Q&A i,m,t   (2) Self-reference_Q&A 
i,m,t   







Manager-call characteristics    
Individualismm   0.091*** 0.174*** -0.015*** 
 (4.507) (4.470) (-6.203) 
CEOm 0.169*** 0.208*** -0.006*** 
 (34.580) (17.421) (-12.355) 
Genderm† -0.051*** -0.009 0.006*** 
 (-2.836) (-0.237) (2.941) 
Agem,t† -0.001*** 0.005*** -0.000*** 
 (-4.142) (4.730) (-2.782) 
Degreem† -0.019 -0.032 0.000 
 (-0.975) (-0.683) (0.000) 
Plain Englishi,m,t 0.023*** -0.132*** -0.003*** 
 (6.886) (-15.362) (-11.069) 
Grammar errorim,,t -0.041*** 0.092*** 0.003** 
 (-3.876) (3.031) (2.574) 
Firm call characteristics    
Log Wordsi,t 0.007 0.050*** -0.003*** 
 (1.097) (4.377) (-4.032) 
Log Participantsi,t 0.008 0.008 0.005*** 
 (1.148) (0.518) (3.627) 
Sizei,t -0.008*** 0.010** -0.000 
 (-3.531) (2.342) (-0.040) 
Qi,t 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.555) (-0.026) (0.641) 
Leveragei,t -0.009 -0.003 0.001 
 (-1.453) (-0.351) (1.168) 
ROAi,t 0.008 -0.046* 0.001 
 (0.429) (-1.821) (0.425) 
ESURi,t 0.050*** -0.002 -0.001 
 (9.180) (-0.169) (-0.924) 
Log analystsi,t 0.003 -0.005 -0.000 
 (0.689) (-0.637) (-0.658) 
D_lossi,t -0.028*** -0.009 -0.000 
 (-4.631) (-0.766) (-0.468) 
Year_endi,t -0.001 -0.000 0.002*** 
 (-0.128) (-0.087) (2.827) 
Ret_fyei,t 0.010*** -0.032*** -0.000 
 (3.561) (-5.217) (-0.881) 
Country characteristics    
Lack of trustc(m),t 0.331*** -0.235 -0.001 
 (2.624) (-0.879) (-0.024) 
Uncertainty avoidancec(m) -0.001* 0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.768) (0.686) (-0.048) 
Market capc(i),t 0.007*** -0.002 -0.001*** 
 (7.959) (-1.258) (-4.629) 
Market returnc(i),t -0.061* -0.002 0.003** 
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 (-1.937) (-0.458) (2.054) 
Synchronicityc(i),t -0.562*** 0.101 0.009 
 (-4.748) (0.500) (0.480) 
Zero returnsc(i),t 0.317*** 0.110 -0.031** 
 (3.972) (1.004) (-2.175) 
Lawc(i) 0.002 0.017*** -0.001 
 (0.747) (3.357) (-1.608) 
    
# of observations 129,787 129,787 129,787 
R-square 0.0694 0.0715 0.0162 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B Only U.S. firms 
 (1) Tone_Q&A i,m,t   (2) Self-reference_Q&A i,m,t   (3) Apologies_Q&A i,m,t   
Individualismm 0.058*** 0.172*** -0.014*** 
 (2.676) (3.834) (-5.258) 
CEOm 0.168*** 0.188*** -0.006*** 
 (27.914) (14.972) (-12.261) 
Genderm† -0.031 -0.041 0.006*** 
 (-1.554) (-0.848) (3.165) 
Agem,t† -0.001*** 0.004*** -0.000** 
 (-3.879) (4.299) (-2.369) 
Degreem† 0.009 -0.080 0.000 
 (0.508) (-1.298) (0.018) 
    
Observations 88,116 88,116 88,116 
R-squared 0.0606 0.0718 0.0113 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Controls in Panel A Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sample US only US only US only 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of disclosure attributes on various country-, 
firm-, and conference-call-level characteristics. Panel A includes observations from all countries in our sample. Panel 
B restricts the sample to only firms headquartered in the U.S. The unit of analysis is an individual manager (m) in an 
earnings conference call- quarter (i,t). All variables are defined in Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † Denotes variables where we include an interaction term 




Table 5 The effect of manager's ethnic background for managers with cross cultural 
experience 




























Manager-call characteristics       
Individualismm   0.273*** 0.092** 0.372*** 0.162*** -0.031** -0.017*** 
 (3.906) (2.242) (2.744) (2.819) (-2.021) (-3.173) 
 
F test 
P value = 0.0224 
 
F test 
P value =0.2669 
 
F test 
P value = 0.2499 
 
 
CEOm 0.164*** 0.177*** 0.206*** 0.213*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 (27.400) (24.168) (15.307) (11.388) (-7.229) (-6.700) 
Genderm† -0.065*** -0.013 0.005 -0.049 0.005** 0.007* 
 (-2.714) (-0.496) (0.100) (-0.856) (2.247) (1.939) 
Agem,t† -0.001** -0.002*** 0.004*** 0.006*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (-2.491) (-3.010) (4.065) (3.092) (-1.304) (-3.672) 
Degreem† -0.014 -0.037** 0.041 -0.101* -0.000 0.001 
 (-0.463) (-2.224) (0.638) (-1.842) (-0.016) (0.483) 
Plain Englishi,t 0.022*** 0.026*** -0.128*** -0.143*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (6.222) (7.016) (-15.215) (-14.595) (-9.030) (-11.242) 
Grammar errori,t -0.038*** -0.050*** 0.086*** 0.111*** 0.002** 0.004*** 
 (-3.852) (-4.189) (2.929) (3.623) (2.063) (4.953) 
Firm call characteristics       
Log Wordsi,t 0.008 0.001 0.049*** 0.059*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 
 (1.353) (0.107) (4.109) (2.886) (-3.339) (-3.310) 
Log Participantsi,t 0.001 0.018 0.008 -0.003 0.005*** 0.005** 
 (0.237) (1.480) (0.434) (-0.132) (4.649) (2.077) 
Sizei,t -0.004 -0.012*** 0.017*** -0.002 -0.000 0.001 
 (-1.509) (-4.042) (3.598) (-0.282) (-1.432) (1.381) 
Qi,t 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000 
 (0.410) (-0.118) (-0.654) (1.324) (0.985) (0.086) 
Leveragei,t -0.023*** 0.002 -0.009 0.003 0.002* 0.000 
 (-2.918) (0.776) (-0.647) (0.335) (1.651) (0.882) 
ROAi,t -0.006 0.029 -0.037 -0.074 0.001 0.002 
 (-0.388) (1.042) (-1.302) (-1.357) (0.379) (0.568) 
ESURi,t 0.053*** 0.038*** 0.004 -0.017 -0.001* 0.001 
 (11.872) (4.114) (0.296) (-0.694) (-1.768) (0.648) 
Log analystsi,t 0.001 0.007 -0.010 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.246) (0.760) (-1.059) (0.309) (-0.690) (-0.032) 
D_lossi,t -0.034*** -0.016 -0.003 -0.026 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-5.225) (-1.547) (-0.194) (-1.617) (-0.318) (-0.290) 
Year_endi,t -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.002*** 0.001 
 (-0.227) (-0.189) (0.119) (-0.287) (2.941) (1.138) 
Ret_fyei,t 0.009*** 0.014*** -0.035*** -0.023** -0.001 0.000 
 (2.859) (4.887) (-5.574) (-2.088) (-1.160) (0.296) 
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Country characteristics       
Lack of trustc(m) 1.831*** -0.035 0.122 -0.282 -0.101* 0.015 
 (4.160) (-0.213) (0.218) (-0.807) (-1.828) (0.518) 
Uncertainty avoidancec(m) -0.008*** 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.000* -0.000 
 (-5.036) (1.430) (-1.396) (0.603) (1.894) (-0.327) 
Market capc(i),t 0.004*** 0.006*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (3.410) (5.752) (-2.775) (-0.720) (-3.769) (-4.977) 
Market returnc(i),t -0.040 -0.049** 0.048*** -0.040 0.001 0.005** 
 (-0.957) (-1.999) (5.974) (-1.297) (0.553) (2.148) 
Synchronicityc(i),t -0.468*** -0.245 0.433*** -0.004 0.000 -0.002 
 (-4.362) (-1.365) (3.251) (-0.010) (0.009) (-0.100) 
Zero returnsc(i),t 0.133 0.239*** 0.011 -0.118 -0.007 -0.042** 
 (1.138) (2.719) (0.076) (-0.636) (-0.385) (-2.280) 
Lawc(i) -0.001 0.000 0.012 0.009 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.149) (0.006) (1.562) (1.199) (-1.034) (-0.683) 
       
# of observations 95,925 33,862 95,925 33,862 95,925 33,862 
R-square 0.0702 0.0783 0.0701 0.0803 0.0150 0.0217 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Panel B: Only U.S. firms  
 (1) Tone_Q&A i,m,t   (2) Self-reference_Q&A i,m,t   (3) Apologies_Q&A i,m,t   
    
Individualismm 0.130*** 0.203** -0.019*** 
 (2.989) (2.267) (-3.163) 
    
Observations 19,858 19,858 19,858 
R-squared 0.0712 0.0916 0.0163 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Firm-level controls 
in Panel A 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Sample US US US 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of disclosure attributes on various country-, 
firm-, and conference-call-level characteristics, separately for observations where the manager is of the same ethnicity 
as the dominant one in the country where is firm is headquartered (local) and where the manager is from a different 
ethnicity as the dominant local one (cross-cultural). Panel A includes observations from all countries in our sample. 
Panel B restricts the sample to only firms headquartered in the U.S. There, only cross-cultural observations are 
reported, because there is no variation in Individualism among local managers. The unit of analysis is an individual 
manager (m) in an earnings conference call- quarter (i,t). All variables are defined in Appendix B. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † Denotes variables where we include an 
interaction term with the underlying variable and an indicator for missing observations in the regression model.  
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Table 6 Firm’s ethnic diversity and standard deviation in disclosure attributes of the 
management team 
 







    
Ethnic diversity 0.033*** 0.061*** 0.006*** 
 (9.438) (7.744) (6.664) 
Plain Englishi,m,t -0.013*** -0.061*** -0.005*** 
 (-6.610) (-14.849) (-9.360) 
Grammar errorim,,t 0.023*** 0.069*** 0.008*** 
 (4.399) (8.962) (6.206) 
Log Wordsi,t -0.078*** -0.103*** -0.006*** 
 (-15.334) (-14.233) (-4.608) 
Log Participantsi,t 0.005 0.007 0.007*** 
 (0.891) (0.556) (5.602) 
Sizei,t 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.001*** 
 (6.709) (3.821) (3.378) 
Qi,t -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (-0.637) (-0.691) (-0.639) 
Leveragei,t -0.006* -0.005 0.001 
 (-1.882) (-0.687) (1.170) 
ROAi,t -0.004 -0.012 0.003 
 (-0.388) (-0.502) (1.168) 
ESURi,t -0.019** -0.014 -0.001 
 (-2.206) (-1.336) (-0.789) 
Log analystsi,t 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.088) (-0.477) (0.225) 
D_lossi,t 0.004 0.011 0.001 
 (0.720) (1.072) (1.048) 
Ret_fyei,t -0.004*** -0.015*** -0.001 
 (-2.992) (-3.711) (-1.021) 
volatility 0.234** 0.285 -0.021 
 (2.045) (1.050) (-0.670) 
stdni 0.053*** 0.024 0.001 
 (2.780) (0.784) (0.361) 
Lack of trustc(m),t -0.115 -0.322*** 0.007 
 (-1.515) (-2.842) (0.339) 
Uncertainty avoidancec(m) -0.001** -0.001* -0.000 
 (-2.458) (-1.858) (-1.283) 
accrual 0.020 0.024 0.004 
 (1.320) (0.784) (1.052) 
Market capc(i),t 0.001 0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.916) (0.028) (-4.296) 
Market returnc(i),t -0.018 0.038 0.007 
 (-0.919) (1.357) (0.999) 
Synchronicityc(i),t -0.020 -0.056 -0.023 
 (-0.212) (-0.375) (-0.818) 
Zero returnsc(i),t 0.038 0.109 -0.049*** 
 (0.838) (1.273) (-2.643) 
Lawc(i),t -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.511) (-0.063) (-1.074) 
Observations 18,454 18,454 18,454 
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R-squared 0.0700 0.0606 0.0352 
Cluster Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FR Yes Yes Yes 
Transcripts Q&A Q&A Q&A 
 
Panel B: Only U.S. firms 






    
Ethnic diversity 0.029*** 0.048*** 0.006*** 
 (8.393) (5.728) (7.037) 
Observations 12,617 12,617 12,617 
R-squared 0.0825 0.0723 0.0200 
Cluster Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Transcripts Q&A Q&A Q&A 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of the standard deviation of disclosure 
attributes on various country-, firm-, and conference-call-level characteristics. Panel A includes observations from 
all countries in our sample. Panel B restricts the sample to only firms headquartered in the U.S. The unit of 
analysis is a firm in a fiscal year (i,t). All variables are defined in Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † Denotes variables where we include an 
interaction term with the underlying variable and an indicator for missing observations in the regression model. 
 
 Table 7 Effect of manager's ethnic background for management discussion vs Q&A portion of the calls 
Panel A: Cross-country sample 
Variables 
Tonei,m,t   Self-referencei,m,t   Apologiesi,m,t   
(1) Q&A (2) 
Presentation 
(3) All (4) Q&A (5) 
Presentation 






















Individualismm   0.091*** -0.065*** 0.019 0.174*** -0.028 0.054* -0.015*** -0.001** -0.015*** 
 (4.507) (-3.719) (1.208) (4.470) (-0.938) (1.779) (-6.203) (-2.460) (-5.145) 
CEOm 0.169*** 0.270*** 0.219*** 0.208*** 0.168*** 0.250*** -0.006*** 0.000 -0.005*** 
 (34.580) (29.573) (35.024) (17.421) (13.993) (24.106) (-12.355) (0.484) (-10.644) 
Genderm† -0.051*** -0.015 -0.034** -0.009 0.033 -0.035 0.006*** 0.000 0.002* 
 (-2.836) (-0.925) (-2.134) (-0.237) (1.467) (-1.626) (2.941) (0.896) (1.798) 
Agem,t† -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (-4.142) (-3.200) (-4.297) (4.730) (7.107) (6.464) (-2.782) (2.861) (0.428) 
Degreem† -0.019 0.018 -0.002 -0.032 0.066 0.019 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.975) (0.846) (-0.116) (-0.683) (1.324) (0.572) (0.000) (1.297) (0.614) 
          
# of observations 129,787 105,311 129,787 129,787 105,311 129,787 129,787 105,311 129,787 
R-square 0.0694 0.1534 0.1263 0.0715 0.0610 0.0908 0.0162 0.0142 0.0129 
Cluster Firm, year Firm-Year Firm-Year Firm, year Firm-Year Firm-Year Firm, year Firm-Year Firm-Year 
Controls in Table 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of disclosure attributes on various country-, firm-, and conference-call-level 
characteristics. Panel A includes observations from all countries in our sample. Panel B restricts the sample to only firms headquartered in the U.S. The unit 
of analysis is an individual manager (m) in an earnings conference call- quarter (i,t). All variables are defined in Appendix B. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 




Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel B Only U.S. firms 
 Tone i,m,t   Self-referencei,m,t   Apologiesi,m,t   



















Individualismm 0.058*** -0.068*** -0.006 0.172*** 0.064** 0.075** -0.014*** -0.000 -0.012*** 
 (2.676) (-3.124) (-0.360) (3.834) (2.040) (2.236) (-5.258) (-0.964) (-3.161) 
CEOm 0.168*** 0.291*** 0.227*** 0.188*** 0.209*** 0.274*** -0.006*** -0.000 -0.003*** 
 (27.914) (27.431) (30.225) (14.972) (17.807) (25.181) (-12.261) (-0.244) (-8.073) 
Genderm† -0.031 -0.003 -0.016 -0.041 0.017 -0.053** 0.006*** 0.001 0.003** 
 (-1.554) (-0.189) (-1.011) (-0.848) (0.792) (-2.279) (3.165) (1.219) (2.219) 
Agem,t† -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.000** 0.000*** -0.000 
 (-3.879) (-4.044) (-4.607) (4.299) (5.693) (5.273) (-2.369) (3.076) (-0.720) 
Degreem† 0.009 0.056** 0.043** -0.080 -0.021 -0.056 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.508) (2.235) (2.370) (-1.298) (-0.559) (-1.266) (0.018) (1.252) (0.115) 
          
Observations 88,116 73,292 88,116 88,116 73,292 88,116 88,116 73,292 88,116 
R-squared 0.0606 0.1827 0.1419 0.0718 0.0756 0.1012 0.0113 0.0044 0.0071 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Controls in 
Table 4 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample US only US only US only US only US only US only US only US only US only 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of disclosure attributes on various country-, firm-, and conference-call-level 
characteristics. Panel A includes observations from all countries in our sample. Panel B restricts the sample to only firms headquartered in the U.S. The 
unit of analysis is an individual manager (m) in an earnings conference call- quarter (i,t). All variables are defined in Appendix B. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. † Denotes variables where we include an interaction term with the underlying variable and an indicator for missing observations 
in the regression model.
 Table 8 Capital market reaction to disclosure tone following the call: Intra-day returns 
 
Dependent Variable: Intra-day returns during the 
Q&As 
Intra-day returns during the MDs Intra-day returns during the Q&A and 
MDs  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tone_Q&Ai,t 0.15*** 0.16***     
 (2.80) (2.64)     
Tone_Q&A i,t  -0.06     
× Low individualism indicator  (-0.83)     
Tone_MD i,t   0.10*** 0.09**   
   (2.68) (1.99)   
Tone_MD i,t    0.07   
× Low individualism indicator    (0.66)   
Tone_alli,t     0.34*** 0.31*** 
     (3.79) (3.20) 
Tone_all i,t      0.20 
× Low individualism indicator      (0.93) 
Low individualism indicator  0.00  0.02  -0.04 
  (0.08)  (0.38)  (-0.48) 
Firm characteristics       
Sizei,t -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.75) (-0.77) (-0.73) (-0.71) 
Qi,t -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.42) (-0.42) (0.34) (0.32) (-0.01) (-0.03) 
Leveragei,t 0.11* 0.11* -0.00 -0.00 0.10 0.10 
 (1.90) (1.90) (-0.05) (-0.07) (1.56) (1.56) 
ROAi,t 0.23 0.23 -0.04 -0.05 0.11 0.11 
 (1.36) (1.37) (-0.19) (-0.20) (0.45) (0.44) 
ESURi,t 0.01 0.01 0.10* 0.10* 0.08 0.08 
 (0.14) (0.15) (1.92) (1.93) (1.04) (1.04) 
Log_analystsi,t -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
 (-0.49) (-0.50) (0.04) (0.06) (-0.41) (-0.41) 
D_lossi,t -0.01 -0.01 0.08* 0.08* 0.06 0.06 
 (-0.28) (-0.28) (1.69) (1.69) (1.06) (1.06) 
Year_endi,t -0.01 -0.02 0.08** 0.08** 0.06 0.06 
 (-0.56) (-0.57) (2.36) (2.36) (1.37) (1.37) 
Ret_fyei,t -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
 (-1.55) (-1.55) (0.31) (0.31) (-0.73) (-0.72) 
Log_wordsi,t -0.02 -0.02 0.07** 0.07** 0.04 0.04 
 (-0.57) (-0.59) (1.98) (2.08) (0.81) (0.83) 
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Returns volatilityi,t 0.44 0.45 -0.61 -0.65 -1.84 -1.84 
 (0.33) (0.34) (-0.44) (-0.48) (-0.67) (-0.67) 
Earnings volatilityi,t 0.04 0.04 -0.51** -0.52** -0.42 -0.42* 
 (0.25) (0.26) (-2.13) (-2.15) (-1.63) (-1.65) 
Replagi,t 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.60) (0.60) (-2.61) (-2.62) (-0.77) (-0.76) 
Accruali,t 0.03 0.03 -0.26 -0.26 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.20) (0.21) (-1.36) (-1.34) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
Participantsi,t -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
 (-0.31) (-0.30) (-1.54) (-1.57) (-1.08) (-1.11) 
Grammar errors,t -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.34) (-0.34) (0.03) (0.03) (0.26) (0.26) 
Plain Englishi,t -0.02** -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 -0.04** -0.04** 
 (-2.11) (-2.11) (-0.85) (-0.87) (-2.06) (-2.09) 
Returns day beforei,t -0.84*** -0.84*** -0.64** -0.64** -1.08*** -1.08*** 
 (-3.68) (-3.69) (-2.51) (-2.50) (-2.93) (-2.93) 
# of observations 15,533 15,533 15,533 15,533 15,533 15,533 
R-squared 0.0049 0.0049 0.0061 0.0062 0.0069 0.0069 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of intraday returns on country-, firm-, and conference-call-level characteristics. 
Low individualism is an indicator variable that equals one when the mean manager individualism is above the country median individualism and zero 
otherwise.  The unit of analysis is an individual manager (m) in an earnings conference call- quarter (i,t). All variables are defined in Appendix B. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † Denotes variables where we include an interaction term with the underlying variable and an indicator for 
missing observations in the regression model.
 Table 9 Additional analyses 
Panel A: An alternative measure of individualism 
 (1) Tone_Q&Ai,m,t   (2) Self-reference_Q&Ai,m,t   (3) Apologies_Q&Ai,m,t   
Predicted individualismm 0.088*** 0.163*** -0.012*** 
 (4.275) (3.271) (-4.636) 
    
# of observations 129,787 129,787 129,787 
R-squared 0.0739 0.0736 0.0181 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Controls in Table4 Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B Including Firm Fixed Effects 
 (1) Tone_Q&Ai,m,t   (2) Self-reference_Q&Ai,m,t   (3) Apologies_Q&Ai,m,t   
Individualismm 0.049*** 0.050** -0.005* 
 (3.324) (2.535) (-1.701) 
Observations 129,787 129,787 129,787 
R-squared 0.1745 0.2266 0.0943 
Cluster Year Year Year 
Controls in Panel A Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel C Change Specification 
 (1) Tone_Q&Ai,m,t   (2) Self-reference_Q&Ai,m,t   (3) Apologies_Q&Ai,m,t   
Individualismi   0.0004* 0.0000       -0.0001*** 
 (1.7082) (1.0028) (-2.9008) 
    
# of observations 54,087 54,087 54,087 
R-squared 0.0127 0.0300 0.0080 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Controls in Table4 Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 




(1) Tone_Q&Ai,m,t   (2) Self-reference_Q&Ai,m,t   (3) Apologies_Q&Ai,m,t   
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Individualismm   0.081*** 0.102*** 0.190*** 0.153*** -0.016*** -0.014*** 
 (3.331) (5.008) (4.248) (3.677) (-4.697) (-4.578) 
 
F test 
P value =0.4272 
 
F test 
P value = 0.4394 
 
F test 
P value =0.4546 
 
 
# of observations 69,504 60,283 69,504 60,283 69,504 60,283 
R-square 0.0737 0.0663 0.0724 0.0719 0.0177 0.0156 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Controls in Table 4  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Notes: Panel A presents results for the second stage of the two stage least square regression where the Euclidean 
distance of the proportion of bloods types A and B by ethnicity is used as an additional explanatory variable of 
individualism in the first stage regression. Panel B presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of 
disclosure attributes on various country-, firm-, and conference-call-level characteristics and includes firm fixed 
effects. Panel C presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of disclosure attributes on various country-, 
firm-, and conference-call-level characteristics using a change specification for all variables. Panel D presents 
coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of disclosure attributes, separately for observations with positive and 
negative earnings surprises. Earnings surprise is defined as the difference between the actual annual EPS minus the 
most recent mean analyst forecast, if available, or a seasonal random walk model otherwise.  In Panels A, B, and D 
the unit of analysis is an individual manager (m) in an earnings conference call- quarter (i,t). In Panel C, the unit of 
analysis is an earnings conference call- quarter (i,t). All variables are defined in Appendix B. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Panel A Measurement Error – Number of ethnicities by last name 
 (1) Tone_Q&Ai,m,t   (2) Self-reference_Q&A i,m,t   (3) Apologies_Q&Ai,m,t   
Individualismm 0.101*** 0.209*** -0.017*** 
 (3.469) (3.138) (-3.925) 
# of Ethnicity 0.010 0.019 -0.001 
(0.487) (0.378) (-0.421) 
# of Ethnicity  x 
Individualismm 
-0.009 -0.032 0.002 
(-0.388) (-0.549) (0.643) 
    
Observations 129,787 129,787 129,787 
R-squared 0.0694 0.0688 0.0163 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Controls Table 4 Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Panel B Excluding female executives 
 (1) Tone_Q&Ai,m,t (2) Self-reference_Q&Ai m,t (3) Apologies_Q&Ai,m,t 
Individualismm 0.099*** 0.177*** -0.014*** 
 (4.974) (4.315) (-5.619) 
    
Observations 125,000 125,000 125,000 
R-squared 0.0670 0.0711 0.0161 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Controls Table 4 Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Panel C Controlling for disclosure characteristics of the management discussions (MDs) 
 (1) Tone_Q&Ai,m,t (2) Self-reference_Q&Ai,m,t (3) Apologies_Q&Ai,m,t 
Individualismm 0.113*** 0.177*** -0.016*** 
 (5.865) (3.885) (-6.174) 
Tone_MD i,m,t   
0.280***   
(57.603)   
Self-reference_MD i,m,t   
 0.206***  
 (18.644)  
Apologies_MD i,m,t   
  0.215*** 
  (14.322) 
Observations 105,311 105,311 105,311 
R-squared 0.1268 0.0861 0.0215 
Cluster Firm, year Firm, year Firm, year 
Controls Table 4 Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel D: Using 3-day CAR 
 Cross-country sample U.S. only sample  
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
       
Tone_Q&Ai,t 2.35***  2.45*** 2.80***  2.80*** 
 (13.65)  (10.42) (10.95)  (10.16) 
Tone_Q&A× Low individualism 
indicator 
  -0.37   -0.02 
   (-1.23)   (-0.06) 
Low individualism indicator   0.10   -0.08 
   (0.77)   (-0.44) 
# of observations 55,399  55,399 39,145  -10.17 
R-squared 0.0521  0.0522 0.0699  (-1.15) 
Cluster Firm, year  Firm, year Firm, year  Firm, year 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
 All  All US only  US only 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of disclosure attributes on various country-, 
firm-, conference-call-level characteristics. Panel A presents results when controlling for the number of ethnicities by 
last name in our sample. Panel B present results excluding female executives. Panel C present results controlling for 
the MD section disclosure attributes.  Panel D presents market reaction using 3-day CAR. In panels A, B, and C the 
unit of analysis is an individual manager (m) in an earnings conference call- quarter (i,t). In Panel D, the unit of 
analysis is an earnings conference call- quarter (i,t).  All variables are defined in Appendix B. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
